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Abstract. Anomalies drive scientific discovery – they are associated with the cutting edge of
the research frontier, and thus typically exploit data in the low signal-to-noise regime. In astron-
omy, the prevalence of systematics — both “known unknowns” and “unknown unknowns” —
combined with increasingly large datasets, the widespread use of ad hoc estimators for anomaly
detection, and the “look-elsewhere” effect, can lead to spurious false detections. In this informal
note, I argue that anomaly detection leading to discoveries of new physics requires a combi-
nation of physical understanding, careful experimental design to avoid confirmation bias, and
self-consistent statistical methods. These points are illustrated with several concrete examples
from cosmology.
Keywords. cosmic microwave background, cosmological parameters, early universe, cosmology:
miscellaneous, methods: statistical, methods: data analysis
1. Introduction
In the next decade, Big Data will form a pivotal part of the experimental landscape
in cosmology, with a multitude of large surveys, from cosmic microwave background
(CMB) experiments, photometric and spectroscopic galaxy surveys, 21 cm arrays, and
direct-detection gravitational wave observatories, expected to yield a deluge of informa-
tion about the origin and evolution of the Universe. The associated high data rates and
huge data volumes, bringing with them the curse of dimensionality, pose challenging
problems for data analysis and scientific discovery. Some of the challenges include: (1)
data compression (i.e., the formulation of almost-sufficient statistics), filtering, sampling,
associated with very large datasets; (2) making robust and accurate inferences or conclu-
sions from such datasets; (3) the small signal-to-noise regime in which discoveries at the
research frontier are often made; (4) a very large model space; (5) cosmic variance (i.e.,
the fact that we have access to a single realisation of an inherently stochastic cosmological
model).
We can imagine two qualitatively different kinds of modelling that would be required
to extract the maximum information from this cornucopia of cosmological data. Mech-
anistic (physical) modelling is what has driven cosmological discovery thus far – in this
case, forward modelling based on physics is feasible, leading directly to standard parame-
ter estimation and model comparison analyses that form the bread and butter of modern
cosmology. However, as cosmological data probe deeper into the non-linear regime of the
evolution of structure, against complex foregrounds, empirical (data-driven) modelling
— characterising relationships discovered in the data — will gain increasing prominence.
Such models may be purely data-driven, or qualitatively based on physics but be re-
quired in cases where forward modelling is infeasible; they may be used to postulate new
theories, or generate statistical predictions for new observables.
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In this context, the treatment of data anomalies acquires great importance. Anoma-
lies — unusual data configurations — can consist of statistical outliers, unusual con-
centrations of data points or sudden behaviour changes. They may arise from chance
configurations due to random fluctuations, systematics (unmodelled astrophysics; instru-
ment/detector artefacts; data processing distortions), or they can indicate genuinely new
discoveries. Determining into which of these categories a given anomaly falls is fraught
with difficulty, especially as humans have evolved in such a way that we can often spu-
riously identify patterns in data where none exist, a phenomenon known as pareidolia.
When considering whether a cosmological anomaly indicates new physics, one must con-
sider that many such anomalies are often identified using a posteriori estimators, which
leads to spurious enhancements of detection significance. In the absence of an alternative
model for comparison, one often cannot account for the “look-elsewhere effect” arising
from multiple testing, or formulate model priors to compare with the standard model. In
the absence of an alternative theory, how can we judge if a given anomaly represents new
physics? In the rest of this article, I will summarise several case studies demonstrating
different approaches to answering this question.
2. Assessing anomalies
There are two distinct steps associated with anomalies in the cosmological context.
The first involves finding data anomalies in the first place — this provides an area of rich
algorithmic development related to assessing measures of irregularity, unexpectedness,
unusualness etc., especially in the coming “Big Data” era. The second involves drawing
inferences from the results of the search for anomalies — i.e., assessing whether the
anomaly is due to random chance, or whether it represents an unknown mechanism
which may point to new physics (or, more prosaically, systematics). In making these
inferences, the particle physicists’ “look-elsewhere effect”, or multiple testing, comes into
play. One must correct for any a posteriori choices that were made in the process of
detecting an anomaly, and properly account for the possible ways in which an anomaly
could have shown up (but did not).
In cases where an alternative model motivated the search for an anomaly or the for-
mulation of the statistic in which an anomaly was discovered, the probability that the
anomaly represents a new physical mechanism (versus random chance) can be assessed
using Bayesian model comparison: the model and parameter priors account for the un-
certainties associated with multiple-testing. Even in this case, however, encapsulating all
the relevant uncertainties can be quite difficult. For example, Cruz et al. (2007) carried
out a Bayesian model comparison analysis of the well-known cosmic microwave back-
ground (CMB) anomaly termed the Cold Spot and concluded that it was likely a texture
(a type of spatially-localised cosmic defect). This was a highly sophisticated analysis —
one of the first principled Bayesian model comparison analyses in the context of CMB
anomalies. Nevertheless, it represents an incomplete attempt to account for a posteriori
selection effects associated with basing the analysis on a single feature at a particular
location which is known to be a statistical outlier.
The texture model predicts a statistically isotropic distribution of spatially-localised
features in the CMB sky (with an expectation value for the sky fraction covered by
textures), and textures can lead to both hot and cold spots in the CMB. Interpreted as
a correction for the “look-elsewhere” effect of having analysed a patch of sky containing
the Cold Spot, the Cruz et al. (2007) analysis accounts for the expected sky fraction
covered by textures in a patch, but does not account for the fact that textures could
be placed anywhere on the sky. The coordinates of the central position of the texture
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template should be marginalised over in the context of statistical isotropy, whereas the
texture template was centred on the Cold Spot in the analysis. There is also a factor of
two associated with the fact that the feature could have been a hot spot, rather than
a cold spot. In Feeney et al. (2012, 2013), where the texture hypothesis is formulated
in terms of a hierarchical Bayesian model, the impact of these a posteriori selection
effects becomes clear and, when fully accounting for these uncertainties in computing
the marginal likelihood, there is no preference for augmenting the standard cosmological
model with textures.
This example highlights how the “look-elsewhere” effect can spuriously enhance the
significance of the anomaly when all the relevant uncertainties are not incorporated
into the formulation of an alternative model representing new physics. Nevertheless, if
one possesses alternative model(s) with well-motivated priors, the standard Bayesian
model comparison framework can be brought to bear on the problem, providing the
most straightforward scenario for assessing anomalies.
3. “Just-so” models
If the anomaly is detected as an unusual property of a large dataset and is not motivated
by an alternative model, accounting for the “look-elsewhere” effect can be highly non-
trivial. In this context, designer theories that stand in for best-possible explanations —
“just-so” models — can prove useful in terms of gaining an intuition for whether the
anomaly provides evidence for new physics.
In this case one would proceed as follows: (a) find a designer theory or “just-so” model
which maximises the likelihood of the anomaly; (b) thus determine the maximum avail-
able likelihood gain for this particular anomaly with respect to the standard model, or
null hypothesis; (c) judge whether this is compelling given the baroqueness of the designer
theory.
Such an example can be found in the context of another well-known CMB anomaly
often termed the C(θ) anomaly (Copi et al. 2007). It is a long-standing observation that
the statistic S1/2 =
∫ 180◦
60◦ [C(θ)]
2 cos(θ)dθ, where C(θ) is the angular correlation function
of the CMB, is anomalous when evaluated outside typical Galactic sky cuts. Here, the
lower integration limit is an a posteriori choice (Bennett et al. 2011). Under the standard
ΛCDM model, the probability of obtaining a cut-sky S1/2 statistic of the observed value
or less is ∼ 0.03%; however, it is notable that the full sky value of S1/2 (evaluated on
reconstructed full sky maps or Galactic foreground-cleaned maps) is not anomalous.
It is possible that such an observation can arise in a cosmological model which breaks
statistical isotropy, in contrast to the standard ΛCDM model; however, a specific well-
motivated broken-isotropy model predicting the observed characteristics of the large-
angle CMB sky is not currently available. Pontzen & Peiris (2010) used a convex optimi-
sation algorithm to maximise the likelihood of the cut sky S1/2 statistic subject to fixed
full sky angular power spectrum multipoles C` over all anisotropic Gaussian models with
zero mean†. Using this technique, they constructed a designer anisotropic model (Fig. 1)
which gives the maximum likelihood improvement over ΛCDM: this model, which had
∼ 6900 degrees of freedom (compared to the isotropic case with eight) gave an improve-
ment in likelihood of lnL ∼ 5. This allowed for a finite limit to be placed on the Bayesian
statistical gain available under a wide class of alternative straw-man models, providing
a plausible way to probe the significance of this a posteriori anomaly.
† The covariance matrix of spherical harmonic coefficients a`m can be can be arbitrarily
correlated, as long as it is positive-definite.
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Figure 1. The m = 0 component of the covariance matrix defining the designer anisotropic
model derived for the S1/2 anomaly (Pontzen & Peiris 2010).
It is interesting to note that the decision-making process after computing the likelihood
gain supplied by the just-so model involves a subjective judgement. For example, Pontzen
& Peiris (2010) concluded that the level of fine-tuning involved in this designer model in
order to provide a relatively small likelihood gain did not make for a compelling pointer
towards new physics. However, a more speculative scientist may make a different decision
to continue the search for an alternative theory, assuming that the number of degrees of
freedom can be dramatically reduced by unknown symmetries. In this case, the designer
model may provide physical intuition about the correlation properties necessary in such
a theory in order to reproduce the observations.
A further example of the utility of just-so models in cosmology where physically-
motivated model priors are not available is found in the context of the number of rela-
tivistic degrees of freedom Neff , which may differ from the standard value of 3.046 due
to, e.g., extra neutrino species. The fundamental debate here focuses on whether ten-
sions observed in cosmological datasets require the standard cosmological model to be
augmented with a non-standard Neff . While this may appear to be a straightforward
Bayesian model comparison problem, the model space leading to Neff differing from the
standard value is vast, and simple priors on Neff may not capture the physical prior
uncertainties. In this context, Verde et al. (2013) show that the profile likelihood ratio
(Wilks 1938) — the ratio of the maximum likelihood conditioned on a particular value of
the parameter of interest and the overall, unconditional maximum likelihood — provides
the parameter value at which a designer model would maximise the Bayesian evidence.
While it is unreasonable to assess a model by tuning it to the same data being used to
test it, this upper limit on the marginal likelihood provides an heuristic assessment of the
possible need for an extra parameter in the absence of well-motivated parameter priors,
as well as a pointer towards its most likely value.
4. Data-driven models
As mentioned above, data-driven models are often constructed a posteriori to fit various
statistical anomalies observed in large data sets. In order to be testable, such tuned
models must, of necessity, make predictions for new data beyond those they were designed
to fit. In the context of CMB anomalies, several studies demonstrate how models designed
to mimic apparent isotropy-breaking features in the CMB temperature field and features
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in the CMB temperature power spectrum can be tested with new data not used in
constructing the model, such CMB polarisation (Dvorkin et al. 2008; Mortonson et al.
2009), large-scale structure data (Pullen & Hirata 2010), and non-Gaussianity (Adshead
et al. 2011; Peiris et al. 2013).
The statistical technique of cross-validation can be used as a powerful method to
test the consistency of physical inferences from datasets by constructing a data-driven
model describing part of the data, and checking how well it predicts the rest of the
data. For example, this technique has been used to characterize the deviation from scale
invariance in the primordial power spectrum in a minimally-parametric way (Verde &
Peiris 2008; Peiris & Verde 2010; Bird et al. 2011). The idea is as follows: (1) Choose
a functional form which allows a great deal of freedom in the form of the deviation
from scale invariance (e.g., smoothing splines)†. (2) Now perform cross-validation: set
aside some of the data (validation set), fit the rest (training set), and see how well it
predicts the validation set. A very good fit to the training set, which poorly predicts the
validation set, indicates over-fitting of noisy data. (3) The final ingredient is a parameter
that penalises fine-scale structure of the functional form. By performing cross-validation
as a function of this parameter, one can judge when the structure in the smoothing spline
is what the data requires without fitting the noise. The technique is also very powerful in
detecting systematic issues in data analysis: Verde & Peiris (2008) identified a “kink” in
the reconstructed power spectrum from WMAP at a particular scale which subsequently
turned out to be a problem in point source subtraction (Huffenberger et al. 2008; Peiris
& Verde 2010).
5. Blind analysis
The data analysis challenges of next-generation cosmological surveys require careful
experimental design to minimize false detections due to experimenters’ (subconscious)
bias. This has been an integral part of the particle physics and medical research culture for
decades, but has yet to find broad adoption within cosmology. As cosmological constraints
make the transition from precise to accurate, and the search for new physics leads to the
hunt for small signals embedded within the ΛCDM cosmology, the systematic bias due
to non-blind experimental design can no longer be ignored if we hope to make convincing
claims for paradigm-shifting new physics from cosmological data.
Blind analysis is based on the simple idea that the value of a measurement does not
contain any information about its correctness. Knowing the value of a measurement is
therefore of no use in performing the analysis itself. Blind analysis is necessary because
data collection, analysis and inference necessarily involves a human stage, which can lead
to unquantifiable subjective inferences. Some examples of the origin of such bias include:
looking for bugs when a result does not conform to expectation (and not looking for them
when it does); looking for additional sources of systematic uncertainty when a result does
not conform to expectation; deciding whether to publish, or wait for more data; choosing
cuts while looking at the data and knowing whether it fits expectations; preferentially
keeping / dropping outlier data. Examples of good experimental design which are used in
cosmology, such as “double unblind” (doing two independent analyses in parallel), “mock
data” analysis, and “semi-blind” (using a fraction of the data to calibrate the analysis
and freezing the pipeline before doing the final analysis), while extremely helpful in their
own right, nevertheless do not constitute blind analysis.
† Naively fitting this to the data will lead one to fit the fluctuations due to noise, with
arbitrary improvement in the goodness-of-fit due to over-fitting.
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Harrison (2002) and Roodman (2003) give examples of systematic trends in measure-
ments (periods of surprisingly small variation, followed by jumps of several standard
deviations) in the presence of experimenters’ bias using examples from particle physics,
and provide some excellent strategies for implementing blind analysis, including:
• Encrypting the science result. e.g., adding a non-changing random number (not
revealed to the analyst) to a numerical result or transforming a variable, in order to
thwart preconceptions due to “expected” results. It is important to note that it is not
necessary to blind how the result changes due to changes in the analysis pipeline, or to
blind calibration data.
• Hiding the “signal region”. This is useful when the observable is a peak or
localised feature in datasets.
• Blind injection of signals into the data. This is useful to test biases in rare event
searches, and has been adopted by the gravitational wave direct detection community.
• Mixing in an unknown fraction of simulated data during calibration, etc.
The first of these, the so-called hidden offset method, is a straightforward technique to
implement at the level of the parameter estimation step for essentially all cosmological
data types; it works as follows. The parameter estimation code adds a fixed, unknown
random number to the fitted value of the measured parameter, x∗ = x+R; x∗ is returned
with the true error and the likelihood value instead of x. R can be set e.g., by sampling
from a Gaussian of mean zero and standard deviation ∼ few times the experimental
standard deviation. Relative changes in the result as the analysis changes can be hidden
using a second offset. Informative visual aspects in plots may need to be hidden as well.
While blind analysis within observational cosmology may be conceptually more diffi-
cult than in an experimental field such as particle physics, nevertheless numerous con-
siderations motivate us to adopt at least some practices that lead to the mitigation of
experimenters’ bias. Such considerations include: (i) the accuracy and reliability of scien-
tific inferences from next-generation surveys; (ii) best return on the enormous investment
of public funds in cosmological surveys, including satellite experiments and large data
analysis efforts requiring huge teams, which may be very difficult — if not impossible
— to replicate due to cost considerations; (iii) the substantial wasted scientific effort in
going down blind alleys due to premature announcements of false detections, a side effect
of which is the potential damage to the public perception of science; and (iv) missing
discoveries of new physics due to overly-cautious treatment of data that do not agree
with expectations.
Even simply thinking about how to blind an analysis pipeline can lead to a greater
understanding of potential pitfalls. Adopting blind analysis practices requires a shift
in community standards, and leadership by large data collaborations. A very welcome
shift in this direction has been made by the weak lensing community, e.g., in the recent
CFHTLenS analyses (Heymans et al. 2012; Fu et al. 2014). The POLARBEAR B-mode
polarisation blind analysis (Ade et al. 2014) represents a milestone in the CMB context,
and such techniques have been in use for some time in supernova cosmology (Conley
et al. 2006). In general, setting all the free parameters in analysis pipelines using only
null-tests is a good blind analysis practice. An example of blind mitigation of systematics
in constraining primordial non-Gaussianity using quasar surveys (Leistedt & Peiris 2014;
Leistedt et al. 2014) is presented elsewhere in these proceedings.
6. Summary
I have presented an informal summary, from a practitioner’s viewpoint, of techniques
for evaluating cosmological anomalies. The discussion has emphasised the pitfalls associ-
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ated with multiple-testing, or the “look-elsewhere” effect. I have given practical examples
of techniques that can be used in the absence of alternative models in order to gain intu-
ition on whether or not a given cosmological anomaly represents new physics. Finally, I
have discussed blind analysis as a strategy to guard against experimenters’ subconscious
bias, which introduces “unknown unknowns” into physical inferences. These techniques
do not represent a cure-all for data analysis problems, but rather cultivate a mindset
that attempts to rise to Feynman’s challenge: “The first principle is that you must not
fool yourself — and you are the easiest person to fool.”
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